It has been suggested that firms with foreign operations stockpile large amounts of cash, primarily in their foreign subsidiaries, because bringing the cash home involves paying a repatriation tax on foreign income. This implies that the stock market should value foreign-held cash less than domestically-held cash. But this effect may be moderated by the impact of investment opportunities abroad that would provide an outlet for the foreign cash and affect how the market values it. This paper empirically examines the difference between the market values of on-balance-sheet cash held domestically and that held abroad by US firms, and the impact of the interaction of the repatriation tax and investment opportunities on this difference. The results show that shareholders assign a higher value to cash held abroad than to cash held domestically, and that the marginal value of foreign-held cash is substantially higher than that of domestic cash for US firms with better foreign investment opportunities. This suggests that the effect of the differential investment opportunities for foreign and domestic cash swamps the repatriation-tax disadvantage of foreign cash. As further evidence, this paper also examines the effect of the exogenous shock provided by the tax repatriation holiday in 2004, and finds that firms with better investment opportunities abroad experienced lower abnormal returns following the passage of that legislation. JEL Classification Numbers: G31, G32, H26
Introduction
Firms in the US hold large amounts of cash on their balance sheets and these amounts have been steadily increasing in recent years. For example, Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2007) document that the average cash-to-assets ratio for corporations has more than doubled from 1 For many firms, a substantial portfion of the cash is held in foreign subsidiaries (e.g. Drucker (2011) ). Why firms hold so much cash and how the market values this cash are interesting questions both theoretically and empirically. In particular, cross-sectional differences in the motivations for holding cash, the locations of the cash holdings, and the market valuation of this cash can be illuminating. This paper focuses on one aspect of these differences by empirically examining how the market valuation of cash held in foreign subsidiaries relative to that held domestically varies in the cross-section of firms and what might account for this variation.
In Modigliani and Miller's (1958) perfect (and frictionless) capital market with no taxes, firms are indifferent between holding a dollar of cash on the balance sheet and paying it out, since the value implications of both choices are identical. However, the introduction of frictions of various sorts, including taxes, can open up a wedge between the net benefit of keeping cash on the balance sheet and the net benefit of distributing it to shareholders.
Various papers have focused on these frictions to both explain why firms sometimes hold large amounts of cash on their balance sheets and the market's valuation of on-balance sheet cash, with the valuation being related to the reason for holding the cash. The justifications offered for holding cash fall into two groups: (i) self-serving behavior by managers that leads to shareholder value destruction (inefficient cash hoarding), and (ii) shareholder-value maximizing behavior that optimally trades off the costs and benefits of holding cash (efficient internal capital markets).
1 Defined in COMPUSTAT as cash and short-term investments.
1
In the first group is Jensen's (1986) free-cash-flow hypothesis that hoarding cash simply provides managers discretionary resources that can be inefficiently deployed for private benefits. Clearly, these problems will be less severe when corporate governance is better, so the market will value on-balance-sheet cash higher when governance is better, which in turns creates a link between corporate governance and cash holdings. Consistent with this, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) and Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) find that firms with weaker corporate governance have smaller cash reserves.
In the second group are papers that have focused on precautionary motives for holding cash (e.g. McLean (2011), Miller and Orr (1966) , and Mulligan (1997) ) that can be theoretically justified on the basis of the benefits of building internal capital markets (e.g. Stein (1997) , and Thakor (1990) ) to exploit future real options to invest, in the face of adverse selection (Myers and Majluf (1984) ) and other frictions. These benefits are likely to be greater for firms that have greater growth opportunities and riskier cash flows. Evidence consistent with this appears in Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999).
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Given these two types of justifications for holding cash, the market value of $1 of cash on the balance sheet can be more or less than $1, depending on the types of firms in the sample. With inefficient cash hoarding, we would expect that the market value of $1 of onbalance-sheet cash is less than $1. With efficient capital markets, if investments are infinitely divisible, we would expect the market value of $1 of on-balance-sheet cash to be driven to $1. But if the firm has real options on lumpy investments, we would expect the market value of on-balance-sheet cash to exceed $1. Empirical estimates of the market value of on-balance-sheet cash suggest that both forces may be at work. Pinkowitz and Williamson (2007) estimate that a marginal dollar of cash for the average firm is valued at about $1.20, whereas Faulkender and Wang (2006) use a different methodology and find that the marginal 2 Along these lines, Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2007) develop a theoretical model in which cash is not merely "negative debt". They show that while cash allows financially-constrained firms to hedge future investment against negative shocks to income, reducing current debt is more effective in increasing income in future high-cash-flow states. Thus, financially-constrained firms prefer higher cash to lower debt if their hedging needs are high, but lower debt to higher cash if their hedging needs are low.
value of cash for the average firm is $0.94; the value is less than $1 as a result of taxes (such as dividend taxes) and agency costs. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) extend the methodology of Faulkender and Wang (2006) to look at the effects of corporate governance on the value of cash holdings. They find that poorly-governed firms have a lower marginal value of cash: $1.00 of cash in a poorly-governed firm is worth between $0.42 and $0.88, whereas it is twice that value in a well-governed firm. And Liu and Mauer (2011) show that an increase in CEO risk-taking reduces the value of cash to shareholders.
While most of this literature has focused on the role of agency problems and informational frictions in explaining cash holdings, Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2007) provide an explanation based on taxes. They argue that partly as a result of the tax penalty for repatriating earnings back to the U.S., there is a tax-based incentive for companies to hold cash abroad since doing so reduces/delays the payment of the repatriation tax on foreign income.
3 Therefore, the repatriation tax argument implies that a dollar of foreign-held cash should be worth less than a dollar of domestically-held cash, since the foreign-held cash is essentially sitting inefficiently "trapped" abroad in firms that want to avoid the repatriation tax.
Other more recent paper provide additional evidence consistent with this argument.
Blouin, Krull, and Robinson (2012) find that a higher proportion of permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) is held in the form of cash in low tax jurisdictions relative to high tax jurisdictions. Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin (2011) provide survey evidence indicating that executives often consider avoiding taxes an important determinant of whether to repatriate foreign earnings. And a working paper by Edwards, Kravet, and Wilson (2012) argues that 3 This tax is equal to the difference between the foreign taxes already paid on earnings and the taxes that would be due if the earnings were taxed at the U.S. rate. As an example, consider $100 earned by a US multinational company in a foreign country with a tax-rate of 10%. If the US tax-rate is 35%, then repatriating the earnings leaves the company with $65 to use, whereas keeping it abroad leaves the company with $90 to use. Thus, the company may have an incentive to keep the cash abroad in order to avoid/delay the additional $25 loss associated with the repatriation tax. A recent Bloomberg article suggests that U.S. firms may have more than $1 trillion of cash sitting offshore (Drucker (2011) ). There are various strategies to avoid paying the repatriation tax, such as legal loopholes and transfer pricing, although Foley et al (2007) suggest that these strategies may be cumbersome and costly for firms to use. because cash is trapped abroad due to the repatriation tax, firms are more likely to use the cash to undertake value-destroying acquisitions.
However, as explained above, there are other mediating variables as well that affect the value of foreign cash -free-cash-flow problems and growth opportunities. Foreign cash may be worth more than domestic cash if growth opportunities abroad are better than at home, so there is a greater need for internal capital markets in foreign operations. These higher growth opportunities abroad may also mean that free-cash-flow problems (e.g. Jensen (1986) ) are less severe in foreign subsidiaries than domestically. 4 For example, Doukas (1995) shows that U.S. firms that bid for foreign firms experience higher abnormal returns when they have a higher q, and that the returns are inversely related to free cash flow for low-q bidders but not for high-q bidders. And while Blouin et. al. (2012) argue that firms hold a higher proportion of PRE in cash due to tax incentives, they also recognize that a number of firms appear to hold high levels of cash in low tax jurisdictions, suggesting that growth plays a larger role than taxes for such firms.
These considerations lead to the following questions that I empirically address in this dominates that of the repatriation tax in contributing to the higher valuation of foreign cash relative to domestic cash. These findings are consistent with the notion that free-cash-flow problems are worse in domestic operations than in foreign operations of profitable investment opportunities at home.
As additional evidence, I examine the effect of an exogenous shock following the enactment of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which provided a one-time tax holiday for firms repatriating cash. The results indicate that firms with poor investment opportunities abroad experienced significant positive abnormal returns following the enactment of the bill, while firms with good investment opportunities abroad did not experience any significant abnormal returns. This is consistent with the hypothesis that firms with good overseas investments are holding cash primarily to fund those investments, so the repatriation tax holiday was of little consequence for them.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the baseline empirical methodology used in the paper. Section 3 describes the data set and summary statistics.
Section 4 includes the main empirical results and discusses their implication. Section 5 examines additional evidence using an event study methodology to examine the effect of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. Section 6 concludes.
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Empirical Methodology
This section describes the empirical methodology used in the analysis. The empirical methodology consists of three main steps. First, the split between foreign-held and domestically-held cash is determined for each firm in the sample. Second, the market values of foreign and domestic cash are estimated. Third, there is an empirical examination of whether the difference in the market values of foreign and domestic cash can be explained by growth opportunity differences.
Estimating the Amounts of Foreign and Domestic Cash
In order to estimate the marginal values of foreign-held and domestically-held cash, levels of both variables at the firm level must be obtained. However, while a measure of the level of overall cash for firms is available in COMPUSTAT, separate measures of the cash held abroad and cash held domestically are not readily available and therefore must be estimated.
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While one would ideally like to have access to the split between domestic and foreign cash, there is reason to believe that estimating this split is the appropriate way to proceed. This is because the question of interest is how the market values domestic versus foreign cash, and since investors themselves also lack access to the actual split of total cash between foreign and domestic cash, they need to rely on estimates as well, just as is done in this paper.
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The methodology of Foley et al. (2007) is employed in order to obtain estimates of the 5 Foley et al. (2007) obtain a direct measurement of foreign cash using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for alternate specifications of their model. However, these are proprietary data which are not readily available, either to investors or to me. In addition, yearly data are needed for the following analysis, and the BEA data are only available at five-year intervals. It appears, therefore, that for the purposes of this paper, it may not be appropriate to use the BEA data.
amounts of domestic and foreign cash held by firms. The following OLS specification is run:
All observations consist of firm-years: the value of the variable for firm i at year t.
Several independent variables are scaled by total assets, TA, in order to normalize for firm size. Cash is defined as cash and short-term investments. NA represents net assets, and is defined as Total Assets less cash. 8 CAPEX is capital expenditures. R&D represents research and development expenditures, and is set to zero if R&D expenditures is missing in COMPUSTAT. Lev is market leverage, the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity, which is defined as the firm's year-end closing stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. CF Std Dev represents cash flow standard deviation, defined as the standard deviation of the firm's earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation as a percentage of total assets. 9 Div Pmt is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm paid a cash dividend in the year, and a value of 0 otherwise. ln(T A) is the natural log of the firm's total assets, in millions of dollars.
BV E M V E
is the ratio of the reported book value of the firm's equity divided by the market value of the firm's equity. Domestic
Income and Foreign Income represent domestic income and foreign income, respectively, and are both pre-tax earnings. Foreign Income is included as a proxy to measure the magnitude of the repatriation tax effect, as firms that have more foreign income tend to hold more cash in order to avoid the repatriation tax, all else being equal. The inclusion of Domestic Income controls for the possibility that a delay between when earnings are received and used will create a positive relationship between cash holdings and income. Tax Burden is a measure of the taxes a firm would face if it chose to repatriate all of its foreign income. It is defined as:
USTaxRate is the marginal tax rate after interest expense, following Graham (1996) . 10 The Burden are the two most important variables in terms of magnitude and significance.
By combining these two variables from equation (1), an estimate of the amount foreign cash is obtained:
Since a firm's total cash is made up of foreign and domestic cash, the estimate of the amount domestic cash is total cash minus the estimate of foreign cash from (3) above:
Negative estimates of Foreign Cash and Domestic Cash are truncated at zero.
Estimating the Market Values of Foreign and Domestic Cash
After obtaining these estimates of domestic and foreign cash, the methodology used by In (3), Tax Burden reflects the tax burden measurement scaled by total assets, which follows from (2) 9 stock returns over the fiscal year are regressed on changes in various firm characteristics:
The overall intuition of (5) In addition to these variables, there are three variables with interaction terms. The first
, is the interaction of market leverage with the change in cash for the firm; this is included in order to estimate the effect of leverage on the marginal value of cash for different levels of cash holdings. The second variable,
is the interaction of the previous period's level of foreign-held cash with the change in cash for the firm; this is included in order to estimate the effect that different levels of foreign cash holdings have on the value of cash. Similarly, the third variable,
is the interaction of the previous period's level of domestically-held cash with the change in cash for the firm. These two terms replace the single aggregated cash variable used by Faulkender and Wang (2006) . They note that since independent variables are scaled by the lagged market value of equity, and since the stock return in the dependent variable is
, the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as the marginal change associated with a change in the corresponding independent variable. Therefore, the coefficient on the change in cash measures the dollar change in shareholder value stemming from a one-dollar change in the amount of cash held by the firm. 12 The overall methodology is similar to a long-term event study, examining abnormal (unexpected) returns within an event window defined to be the fiscal year.
The coefficients of the foreign and domestic cash interaction variables (λ 11 and λ 12 above), in addition to the coefficients of the other variables interacted with the change in cash, provide estimates of the marginal value to shareholders of foreign-held and domesticallyheld cash, respectively, for different levels of cash holdings. Therefore, following (5) above:
and
Thus, the value of either foreign-held or domestically-held cash for the average firm is
given by the marginal value of $1 of cash not accounting for leverage effects or levels of cash holdings (λ 1 above) added to the marginal value of $1 cash accounting for levels of leverage and cash holdings (which, for the average firm, is calculated using the mean values of Lev, Foreign Cash scaled by the market value of equity, and Domestic Cash scaled by the market value of equity for the sample).
As discussed earlier, if firms are stockpiling cash abroad in order to avoid or delay payment of the repatriation tax (and the cash is thus inefficiently "trapped" abroad), then we would expect foreign cash to be worth less than domestic cash. However, if factors other than taxes, such as valuable growth opportunities abroad, are the main driver behind firms' decision to hold cash abroad and these result in smaller free-cash-flow problems abroad, then we would expect foreign cash to be worth more than domestic cash. These two effects pull against each other and lead to the following Hypothesis:
The values of foreign and domestic cash may be significantly different from one another. If the repatriation-tax effect is dominant, the value of foreign cash will be lower than the value of domestic cash. If the foreigninvestment-opportunities effect is dominant, the value of foreign cash will be higher than the value of domestic cash.
Calculating the Effect of Investment Opportunities on the
Value of Cash
In order to further investigate the foreign-growth-opportunities argument implicitly in Hypothesis 1, the final step is to examine whether the difference between the shareholder valuation of cash held abroad and cash held domestically is indeed driven by the difference between foreign and domestic reinvestment opportunities.
To see how relative reinvestment/growth opportunities may affect the valuation difference between foreign and domestic cash, note that most U.S. companies pursue foreign markets because these markets offer higher growth opportunities than domestic operations in the U.S. 13 Examples are numerous. The emerging markets in Brazil, Russia, India, and China are all attractive foreign destinations for U.S. companies, and all these are high-growth markets. Moreover, even in developed countries like those in Europe, growth potential may be higher as the market for the firm's products may be less saturated than in the U.S. Higher growth opportunities also mean that the demand for investment is higher, which further implies that internally-generated cash in foreign operations will have a higher shadow price for being used for purposes other than reinvestment compared to internally-generated cash in domestic operations. 14 This higher shadow price will tend to lead to a smaller free-cash-flow problem (e.g. Jensen (1986)) in foreign subsidiaries than in domestic operations as managers in foreign subsidiaries will perceive wasteful expenditures on things such as perquisites (e.g.
Jensen and Meckling (1976)) and pet projects to be relatively more costly. Conditional on growth opportunities abroad being sufficiently high, U.S. corporations would be able to use up all of their foreign cash in investments outside the U.S. and there would be little that is repatriated to the U.S. If this is true, the repatriation tax would not be significant and its impact on the valuation of foreign cash would be relatively small.
Moreover, foreign cash in firms with good growth opportunities should be valued significantly higher than foreign cash in firms with poor growth opportunities, since the latter are more likely to be adversely affected by the repatriation tax burden and free-cash-flow problems stemming from a relatively low shadow price of cash. This further implies that foreign cash for firms with poor investment opportunities should be valued at a discount to $1, while foreign cash for firms with good investment opportunities should be valued at a premium to $1, particularly since real options to invest in the future are likely to involve lumpy investments, so the firm cannot invest all the way up to the point at which the NPV of the investment is zero, i.e. these will be options to invest in positive NPV projects. To summarize, this discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Firms with good investment opportunities abroad should have substantially higher values of foreign cash than firms with poor investment opportunities abroad. In addition, foreign cash for firms with good investment opportunities abroad should be worth more than $1, while foreign cash for firms with poor investment opportunities abroad should be worth less than $1.
The tests will focus on firms that derive a relatively high fraction of their income from abroad because the hypothesized effects on the value of cash are expected to be more pronounced for these firms. 15 To test these predictions, this paper uses an extension of the methodology used by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). 16 Thus, the main regression specification below is run:
The variables are defined in the same way as in regression (5) that relate Tobin's q to overinvestment. The calculation of the q-ratio in this paper follows the procedure of Lindenberg and Ross (1981) and the approximation by Chung and Pruitt (1994) . It is defined as:
MVE, Debt, and TA are defined above. Preferred Stock is the liquidating value of the firm's outstanding preferred stock.
By defining the dummy variables this way and interacting them, the impact of foreign investment opportunities on the value of cash can be determined. For example, for firms with good investment opportunities and high levels of foreign operations, τ 13 will represent the contribution to the value of cash stemming from the good foreign investment opportunities, while the τ 14 term will be 0. For firms with poor investment opportunities and high levels of foreign operations, the τ 13 term will be 0, and τ 14 will represent the deduction from the value of cash stemming from the poor foreign investment opportunities. 17 Therefore, in a manner similar to (6) and (7) above, by focusing on the respective coefficients in (8), one can examine the marginal value of cash held abroad and cash held domestically for U.S.
firms with different levels of foreign investment opportunities, and thus infer whether foreign investment opportunities are driving the difference between the cash values:
17 For firms with high levels of foreign operations, it is assumed that most of the investment opportunities will be abroad. This is a necessary assumption because it is not possible with the current data to separately measure Tobin's q for investment opportunities in foreign subsidiaries. 18 An alternative approach to interacting the two dummy variables would be to conditionally run the regression for only firms with high foreign operations -running separate regressions for the firms with high foreign operations and either good or poor investment opportunities. This is also in line with Faulkender and Wang (2006) , who consider separate results for financially constrained vs. unconstrained firms. Similarly, one could also define the dummy variables using terciles or quartiles to denote high values. These approaches are considered separately for the regression in untabulated results, and the results are robust to these alternate specifications.
Value(Domestic Cash | good investment opportunities abroad) =
Value(F oreign Cash | poor investment opportunities abroad) =
and Value(Domestic Cash | poor investment opportunities abroad) =
Equations (10)- (13) above are interpreted in a similar way to equations (6) and (7).
By adding the coefficient of the interaction terms between Cash, High For Ops, and either Good Inv Opp or Poor Inv Opp, the marginal value of foreign and domestic cash can be estimated specifically for firms with good or poor investment opportunities abroad.
Equation (10) 
Data and Summary Statistics
The data in this paper are taken from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database, available through the Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS). The sample includes all U.S. firms incorporated in the U.S. with total assets exceeding $100 million, excluding all financial firms and utilities (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999, and between 4900 and 4999, respectively).
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Financial firms are excluded because they are required to meet certain statutory cash-asset reserve requirements, and they also hold substantial amounts of marketable securities that are included in cash. Utilities are excluded because their cash holdings are subject to regulatory supervision in many cases. Firms that are incorporated outside of the U.S. are excluded from the sample because the U.S. repatriation tax does not apply to them. The final sample includes 10,899 firm-year observations for a total of 1,643 firms.
Firms which report no foreign income or foreign taxes are excluded from the sample.
The sample period ranges from 1980 to 2006. All data are converted to real 2006 dollar values using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). In all regressions, the independent variables are winsorized at the 1% level in order to reduce the impact of outliers. 20 The marginal tax rate data is estimated following the method of Graham (1996 is skewed -a few firms hold large amounts of foreign cash, as a percentage of the market value of equity of the firm. This may also be because not all of the firms with foreign cash are being picked up due to noise in the estimation of the level of foreign cash, and also since firms are not required to report foreign income.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Main Results
In this section, the results of the empirical tests are discussed using the approach described in [Insert Table 3 here]
Estimating the Amounts of Foreign and Domestic Cash
The coefficient of F oreign Income/T A is significant at the 0.10 level, and has a negative sign, which means that an increase in foreign income will decrease overall firm cash holdings.
While this finding is at odds with the results of Foley et al. (2007) , it is in line with the investment-opportunities-abroad Hypothesis posited in this paper. If a firm's foreign operations are experiencing high growth, the firm will have to make sizable reinvestments 20 to sustain this growth, and these reinvestments may well exceed the contemporaneous cash flows being generated abroad. This would not only lead to all of the foreign cash being reinvested, but also some domestic cash being siphoned off to finance the reinvestment, leading to the relationship documented here. This is an economically plausible explanation since an important reason why many US firms expand internationally is to pursue higher growth prospects abroad.
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The regression coefficients on and Tax Burden, β 9 and β 10 , respectively, are used in equation (3) to obtain an estimate of the amount of foreign cash. The amount of domestic cash is obtained by deducting the estimated amount of foreign cash from total cash, as shown in equation (4).
Estimating the Market Values of Foreign and Domestic Cash:
Testing Hypothesis 1
Using these estimates, the marginal values of foreign and domestic cash are estimated from regression (5). The results of this regression are included in [Insert Table 4 here]
The coefficient for (∆Cash) t × (Domestic Cash) t−1 is negative and significant, as expected. As explained above, since the stock return is the excess equity return divided by the lagged market value of equity and the independent variables are scaled by the lagged market value of equity, the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as the marginal value associated with a change in the corresponding independent variable. The original regression indicates a negative coefficient for the interaction of the change in cash and lagged holdings of total cash, indicating that as firms' cash positions improve, the marginal value of that cash declines, which is economically intuitive. The negative coefficient for the interaction of the change in cash and lagged holdings of domestic cash concurs with the original findings, and indicates that this declining marginal value of cash holds for domestic cash as well. This is the case because cash-starved firms are more likely than others to raise external funds that may be costly, and thus would receive a greater benefit from having more internal funds (cash). However, the coefficient for (∆Cash) t × (F oreign Cash) t−1 is positive and insignificant. This is somewhat surprising, but it may be because there are two forces pulling in opposite directions. On the one hand, the higher the amount of foreign cash, the lower is its marginal value, as I have argued in the case of domestic cash. On the other hand, a higher amount of foreign cash may also signify higher growth opportunities abroad, which would imply a higher marginal value of cash. This could lead to a positive but insignificant coefficient as these two opposing forces partially negate each other. In addition, as can be seen from the summary statistics, the amount of foreign cash held is driven by a small number of 22 firms. This might be a reflection of missing data, since firms are not required to report their foreign operations. This may also be a factor leading to the insignificant coefficient.
With these coefficient values, the marginal value of cash held abroad and cash held domestically can now be estimated and examined for the average firm. Plugging the coefficient values above into equations (6) and (7) gives a marginal value of cash held abroad of $1.06 and a marginal value of cash held domestically of $0.93. Thus, cash held abroad is valued at a premium to $1, and cash held domestically is valued at a discount to $1. These numbers generally fall in line with the results obtained by Faulkender and Wang (2006) , who find that the marginal value of overall cash is approximately $0.94 for the average firm. The results also show that the average marginal value of foreign cash is statistically significantly higher than the average marginal value of domestic cash. 22 Moreover, these results are also robust to an alternate estimate of the amounts of foreign and domestic cash, which is detailed in 
Determining if Differences in Investment Opportunities Drive the Difference in the Values of Foreign and Domestic Cash:
Testing Hypothesis 2
To examine whether differences in investment opportunities are driving the higher value of cash held abroad versus cash held domestically, regression (8) is estimated. The results are presented in Table 5 . All coefficients from regression (5) remain mostly unchanged in terms of magnitude, sign, and significance. The coefficient of (∆Cash) t × (High F or Ops) t × (Good Inv Opp) t is positive and significant at the 5% level, and the coefficient of (∆Cash) t × (High F or Ops) t × (P oor Inv Opp) t is negative, although insignificant. The signs of the two coefficients indicate that a firm with good foreign investment opportunities will have a higher [Insert Table 5 here]
Overall, the results provide strong support for Hypothesis 2: firms use their cash held abroad to finance investment opportunities, and firms with better growth opportunities abroad have higher values of domestic and foreign cash. In addition, the results indicate that cash held domestically and abroad are both valued at a premium to $1.00 in high-growth firms. This suggests that, for these firms, the repatriation tax disadvantage of holding cash abroad is swamped by the valuable investment opportunities of these firms. However, for firms with overall poor growth opportunities, cash held domestically and abroad are both valued at a discount to $1.00. Moreover, the value of foreign cash for firms with poor investment opportunities abroad ($0.92) is substantially lower than the value of foreign cash for firms with good investment opportunities abroad ($1.42), likely reflecting the potential impact of the repatriation tax burden as well as free-cash-flow problems.
Robustness and Alternate Measures of Cash
As the results in sub-sections 4.1 to 4.3 are based upon an estimation of the amounts of foreign-held and domestically-held cash that firms carry, a concern is whether the results are robust to alternative estimations of these cash amounts. An alternative method is presented to proxy for the amounts of cash, and the values of foreign and domestic cash are calculated using these estimates.
The estimation method is to use coefficient estimates from 
The variables are defined analogously to regression (1 
+0.038(ln(T
Negative estimates of cash are truncated at zero. In (16) , Eff Repat Tax is a proxy for Eff
Repat Tax Rate, since the latter is measured using BEA data for the exact foreign tax that firms face. It is defined as:
Summary statistics for (15), (16), and (17) when applied to the data are included in Table   6 . . 24 The mean and standard deviation of these estimates of foreign and domestic cash are close to the estimates obtained earlier in the paper.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Column (1) of Table 7 includes regression results for equation (5) cash valued at $1.06), and once again indicate that the value of foreign cash is valued at a premium to $1, and is significantly higher than the value of domestic cash, which is valued at a discount to $1. Column (2) of Table 7 includes regression results for equation (8) . The magnitudes and signs of the regression coefficients are also very similar to those obtained in [Insert Table 7 abroad to avoid the repatriation tax rather than to reinvest the cash abroad, so these firms should experience a significant positive effect from the passage of the tax holiday. However, firms with good investment opportunities abroad are holding cash abroad mainly in order to invest in projects and to a lesser extent to avoid the repatriation tax, so the tax break should not have a significant effect for these firms.
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Event Study Methodology and Results
In order to test this prediction, an event study methodology is used to examine the cumulative House of Representatives. 25 The market model can be represented as
where R i,τ is the return of stock i at time τ , and R m,τ is the market return at time τ (proxied by the value-weighted . The Fama-French three-factor model can be represented as
where R hml and R smb are the returns of the HML and SMB portfolios, respectively. For each security i, regressions (18) and (19) are estimated in order to produce parameter estimates for the regression coefficients. Denoting the parameter estimates via OLS from (18) and (19) byα andβ, the estimated abnormal returns of security i at time τ for the market model and the Fama-French model are:
and between two dates τ 1 and τ 2 are defined as the sum of the average abnormal returns between those dates:
where (22) is calculated separately for firms with good investment opportunities abroad and for firms with poor investment opportunities abroad. The reason for focusing on this interval is that the bill was introduced to Congress and the public on June 4th, a few days before it won passage in the House. During this period (and even after the bill passed the House), we would expect to see a gradual revelation 26 Because these variables are only reported on a yearly basis, the values as of the previous fiscal year-end (i.e. 2003) are used. As before, for firms with high levels of foreign operations, the assumption is that most of the investment opportunities will be abroad. This is because it is not possible with the data to separately measure investment opportunities that are specifically based abroad. The results are also robust to defining high foreign operations or good investment opportunities as being in the upper tercile or quartile of the sample rather than the upper half.
of information regarding how likely the bill was to be passed, as well as an evolution of the market's assessment of the foreign cash positions and investment opportunities of the affected firms. If this were the case, we would expect to see a steady positive increase in the abnormal returns for firms with poor foreign investment opportunities (rather than a large discontinuous jump over just one or two days), but flat/insignificant abnormal returns for firms with good foreign investment opportunities. The sample represents a total of 4,867 returns total of 157 firms -97 firms with good investment opportunities abroad, and 60 firms with poor investment opportunities abroad.
[Insert Table 8 Here] As Figure 1 indicates, firms with good investment opportunities abroad did not seem to experience any significant abnormal returns either immediately before or after the American Jobs Creation Act was passed in the House -the dashed line for CARs seems to hover around 0. By contrast, firms with poor investment opportunities abroad seemed to experience positive cumulative abnormal returns before the Act was passed (i.e. around the time when it was introduced), and the CARs steadily increase around and past the date when the bill was passed. This seems to support the interpretation that firms with poor investment opportunities abroad are stockpiling cash abroad to avoid the repatriation tax rather than to reinvest the cash abroad, so thus these firms experience a significant positive effect from the passage of the tax holiday. However, firms with good investment opportunities abroad are holding cash abroad mainly in order to invest in projects and to a lesser extent to avoid the repatriation tax, so the tax break does not have a significant effect for these firms.
A formal statistical test buttresses the graphical evidence. Following Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997), under the null hypothesis that the expectation of the abnormal returns is zero, we can draw inferences about the CARs using the fact that CAR τ 1 ,τ 2 ∼ N 0,σ
is the variance of CAR τ 1 ,τ 2 . We can then test the null hypothesis using
is the sample variance of CAR τ 1 ,τ 2 . When using CARs calculated through the Fama-French three-factor model, applying (23) to firms with good foreign investment opportunities yields J 1 = 0.71, and applying it to firms with poor foreign investment opportunities yields J 1 = 3.29. 27 These results provide statistical evidence that firms with poor investment opportunities abroad experienced positive and significant abnormal returns as a result of the American Jobs Creation Act, but firms with good investment opportunities abroad did not experience any significant abnormal returns, indicating that investment opportunities are a significant driver of multinational firms' decision to hold cash abroad. 28 
Robustness of Event Study Results
As noted by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) and others, when event dates are clustered, resulting in cross-sectional correlation of abnormal returns, standard errors can be severely biased in terms of over-rejecting the null hypothesis of zero average abnormal returns. Since there is only one common event date of interest amongst the firms in the sample, this cross-sectional correlation is a concern in this setting. As an alternative robustness check in order to account for this potential bias, the portfolio method following Jaffe (1974) is used to conduct the event study.
Specifically, firm returns are aggregated into equal-weighted portfolios for each date in event time, and the event study analysis is applied to the portfolios. Thus, the following model is estimated over all trading days in 2004:
In (24), p represents the equal weighted portfolio of all firms in the sample, which is consid- (24), the coefficient on the dummy variable, φ p , thus corresponds to the average abnormal returns surrounding the enactment of the bill. Based on the previous discussion, it is predicted that φ p will be positive and significant for firms with poor investment opportunities abroad, but insignificant for firms with good investment opportunities abroad.
[Insert Table 9 here]
The results of regression (24) are included in Table 9 . The specifications in columns (1) and (2) form the portfolios using only firms with poor investment opportunities abroad, and 29 Thus this event window captures the period in time from when the bill was introduced and when it passed the House, during which time information about the probability of passage and the foreign cash holdings of firms was likely slowly revealed to the market. There is a caveat about one limitation of the analysis. The Faulkender and Wang (2006) approach does not deal with the issue that there is an endogeneity problem that arises from the fact that more profitable firms tend to generate more cash, so it may not be that cash drives the value but also that value determines how much cash the firm holds. Although market-based measures of value are forward looking, the fact that they may be correlated with contemporaneous profitability makes the interpretation of the regression coefficients tricky.
The focus of this paper has been on how the determinants of the demand for cash within firms -as represented by investment opportunities that firms have and the taxes in the domains in which they operate -are correlated with how investors value the cash these firms hold on their balance sheets. An obvious factor that is not accounted for is the supply side.
One can imagine that the market value of on-balance-sheet cash is also affected by the cost and availability of liquidity for firms through, say, the commercial paper market and bank lines of credit. It would be interesting to include these factors in future research. (1), which is used to estimate the amounts of foreign and domestic cash. Mean, standard deviation, and quartile values are provided for each variable. Indicated variables are scaled by total assets, TA, in order to normalize for firm size. NA is net assets, defined as total assets less cash. Cash/N A is cash and short-term investments as a percentage of net assets. R&D/TA is the amount of research and development expenses scaled by total assets for each firm, and is set to zero if R&D expenditures is missing in COMPUSTAT. CAPEX/TA is capital expenditures as a percentage of total assets for each firm. Lev is defined as the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. CF Std Dev is defined as the standard deviation of the firm's earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation as a percentage of total assets. Div Pmt is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm paid a dividend in the year, and a value of 0 otherwise. ln(T A) is the natural log of total assets, in millions of dollars. BV E/M V E is the ratio of the reported book value of the firm's equity, divided by the market value of the firm's equity, which is defined as defined as the firm's year-end closing stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. Both Domestic Income and Foreign Income are pre-tax earnings, and are included as a percentage of total assets. The overall Tax Burden variable reflects the repatriation tax faced by firms to repatriate their foreign earnings back to the U.S. It is defined as a percentage of total assets of the firm. All variables except for Div Pmt and ln(T A) have been winsorized at the 1% level. This table provides summary statistics of data used in regression (8) . Mean, standard deviation, and quartile values are provided for each variable. Excess Stock Return is defined as the stock's return over a given year minus the stock's benchmark portfolio over the same year. With the exception of Mkt Leverage, all independent variables are standardized for size by the lagged market value of equity. X represents 1-year change: X t − X t−1 . Cash is defined as cash holdings plus marketable securities. Earnings is earnings before interest and extraordinary items. NA is net assets, defined as total assets excluding cash. R&D represents research and development expenditures for the firm. Dividends are total dividends, and Interest is interest expense, as reported by the firm. Mkt Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. NF is net financing, defined as total equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption. F oreign Cash t−1 is the lagged estimate of foreign cash. Domestic Cash t−1 is the lagged estimate of domestic cash. High For Ops is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a firm-year is in the top half of the sample reporting foreign income in terms of amount of foreign operations as a percentage of total operations, and a value of 0 otherwise. Good Inv Opp is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a firm-year is in the top half of the sample in terms of Tobin's q (q-ratio). Poor Inv Opp is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a firm-year is in the bottom half of the sample in terms of q-ratio, and 0 otherwise. The q-ratio is defined as the market value of equity (defined as the product of its share price and the number of common shares outstanding) plus preferred stock (the liquidating value of the firm's outstanding preferred stock) plus debt (the value of short-term liabilities net of short-term assets, plus the book value of long term debt), all divided by the book value of the total assets of the firm. Foreign Operations is defined as F oreign Income/T A. The q-ratio and Foreign Operations are used for the calculation of the dummy variables, but are not directly included in the regression. All variables have been winsorized at the 1% level. (1), which is used to calculate foreign and domestic cash levels. The dependent variable is Cash/N A. NA is net assets, defined as total assets less cash. Indicated variables are scaled by total assets, TA, in order to normalize for firm size. R&D/TA is research and development expenses scaled by total assets for each firm, and is set to zero if R&D expenditures is missing in COMPU-STAT. CAPEX/TA is capital expenditures as a percentage of total assets for each firm. Lev is defined as the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. CF Std Dev is defined as the standard deviation of the firm's earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation as a percentage of total assets. Div Pmt is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm paid a dividend in the year, and a value of 0 otherwise. ln(T A) is the natural log of total assets, in millions of dollars. BV E/M V E is the ratio of the book value of the firm's equity to the market value of the firm's equity, which is defined as defined as the firm's year-end closing stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. Both Domestic Income and Foreign Income are pre-tax earnings, and are included as a percentage of total assets. The overall Tax Burden variable reflects the repatriation tax faced by firms to repatriate their foreign earnings back to the U.S. It is defined as a percentage of total assets of the firm. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level, with the exception of Div Pmt and ln(T A). Specification includes year and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for correlation across observations of a given firm (White (1980) ). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. (8) . The dependent variable is Excess Stock Return, defined as the return of a stock's benchmark portfolio over a given year subtracted from the return of that stock during the same year: Rb i,t is the benchmark portfolio return of a stock over a given year, and R i,t is the return of that stock over the same year. All variables except for Lev and Excess Stock Return are scaled by the lagged market value of equity (M V E i,t−1 ). ∆X represents 1-year change: Xt − X t−1 . Cash is defined as cash holdings plus marketable securities. Earnings is earnings before interest and extraordinary items. NA is net assets, defined as total assets excluding cash. R&D represents research and development expenditures for the firm. Div is cash dividends, and Int is interest expense, as reported by the firm. Lev is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. NF is net financing, defined as total equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption. (F oreign Cash) t−1 is the lagged estimate of foreign cash. (Domestic Cash) t−1 is the lagged estimate of domestic cash. High For Ops is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a firm-year is in the top half of the sample in terms of amount of foreign operations as a percentage of total operations, and a value of 0 otherwise. Good Inv Opp is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a firm-year is in the top half of the sample in terms of Tobin's q (q-ratio). Poor Inv Opp is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a firm-year is in the bottom half of the sample in terms of q-ratio, and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for correlation across observations of a given firm (White (1980) ). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. (5) , and column (2) presents the results of regression (8) using the alternate measures of foreign and domestic cash defined by (16) and (17) .The dependent variable is Excess Stock Return, defined as the return of a stock's benchmark portfolio over a given year subtracted from the return of that stock during the same year: Rb i,t is the benchmark portfolio return of a stock over a given year, and R i,t is the return of that stock over the same year. All variables except for Lev and Excess Stock Return are scaled by the lagged market value of equity (M V E i,t−1 ). ∆X represents 1-year change: Xt − X t−1 . Cash is defined as cash holdings plus marketable securities. Earnings is earnings before interest and extraordinary items. NA is net assets, defined as total assets excluding cash. R&D represents research and development expenditures for the firm. Div is cash dividends, and Int is interest expense, as reported by the firm. Lev is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. NF is net financing, defined as total equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption. (F oreign Cash) t−1 is the lagged estimate of foreign cash. (Domestic Cash) t−1 is the lagged estimate of domestic cash. High For Ops is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a firm-year is in the top half of the sample in terms of amount of foreign operations as a percentage of total operations, and a value of 0 otherwise. Good Inv Opp is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a firm-year is in the top half of the sample in terms of Tobin's q (q-ratio).
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Poor Inv Opp is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a firm-year is in the bottom half of the sample in terms of q-ratio, and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for correlation across observations of a given firm (White (1980) ). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. (24) . The dependent variable, R p,τ , is the equalweighted average of returns for portfolio p as of event time τ . R m,τ is the market return on date τ , which is the return of the value-weighted CRSP market index. R hml and R smb are the returns from the Fama and French (1993) value and size portfolios. I τ is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the date τ falls in the event window, which is τ = −15 to 15, and a value of 0 otherwise. Specifications (1) and (2) form the portfolio using only firms with poor investment opportunities abroad, defined as firms that are in the upper half of the sample in terms of , and are also in the upper half of the sample in terms of q-ratio. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
CARs Calculated Using Fama-French Factors
